Introduction
The labour unrest and strike violence that has brutalised the South African labour market in recent times can be attributed, in part, to inter-union rivalry. 1 Minority unions, seeking to stake their claim in a sector or business, have declared "turf-war" against majority unions -with this often escalating into loss of life, 2 damage to property, and dire economic consequences. This labour unrest have had both local and global repercussions, which is evidenced in a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increasing unemployment rates in the sectors affected. 3 The condition of the mining sector -ravaged by inter-union rivalry between the minority union Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union (AMCU) and the majority union National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) -bears testament to these effects. During August-September 2012 44 people died due to strike-related violence at Lonmin's Marikana mine -including 34 people killed by police in a single day. The South African Institute of Race Relations reports that between January 1999 and October 2012 181 people have died in strike violence, 313 people were injured, and over 3058 were arrested (see Windgrin 2013 http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29097:nearly-200-killed-in-strike-action-in-13-years-sairr&catid=3:Civil+Security&Itemid=113).
3
In the mining sector, mining production dropped 4.5% (R12 billion) between June 2012 and March 2013 -resulting in a negative impact on South Africa's GDP and currency depreciation. In 2013, the Fraser Institute downgraded South Africa to 64 th out of 96 countries in respect of investor friendliness (see Leon 2013 http://politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/ page71619?oid=427549&sn=Detail&pid=71616). 4 In the platinum sector, labour stoppages since late 2012 have cost the sector approximately R18 billion in lost revenue and 900 000 oz in lost output. The ongoing strikes in early 2014 at Implats are estimated to be costing the mine R400 million per day in lost revenue (see Burkhardt 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-04-platinum-pay-strike-costs-south-africa-36-million-a-day).
organisations to bargain collectively. 5 In furtherance of these objectives, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) provides a regulatory framework for collective bargaining and organisational rights -in keeping with international and constitutional obligations. Trade unions are the vehicles for effective collective bargaining, while the LRA unequivocally promotes the policy choice of majoritarianism. 6 The Labour Appeal Court in explains the majoritarian principle as being that:
the will of the majority should prevail over that of the minority. This is good for orderly collective bargaining as well as for the democratization of the workplace and sectors … a proliferation of trade unions in one workplace or in a sector should be discouraged.
In keeping with these objectives, section 21(8)(a)(i) of the LRA directs commissioners, in resolving recognition disputes, to:
seek to minimise the proliferation of trade union representation in a single workplace, and where possible, to encourage a system of a representative trade union in a workplace. to enable the parties to put a numerical figure to the otherwise somewhat indeterminate concept of 'sufficiently representative' for which the stipulated sections (12, 13 and 15) provide. But the primary object of the section is to promote workplace majoritarianism, that is, the system under which a single union or group of unions enjoy exclusive rights or representation within a workplace ...
In furtherance of the majoritarian framework, collective agreements concluded between majority unions and employers can be extended to non-parties to the agreement in terms of section 23 (1) were binding on the minority union -SA Correctional Services Workers Union (SACOSWU). The court was required to consider further whether the extension of such collective agreements to SACOSWU could be relied upon by POPCRU to prohibit SACOSWU from securing organisational rights. In so doing, the Labour Court had to reconcile the fundamental principle of freedom of association and the right to fair labour practices (to organise and engage in unfettered collective bargaining) within the context of the majoritarian framework created by the LRA.
The facts
The employer in this matter, the Department of Correctional Services (the Department), operates in terms of a formal and agreed bargaining and disputeresolution structure composed of two bargaining councils and a central bargaining noted that "given the nature of s 18 and the agreements flowing from it, it is, of course, ordinarily permissible for the parties to a threshold agreement to enter into a new agreement or amend the existing agreement and, in so doing, increase the threshold for the grant of organizational rights".
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The provision requires such employees to be identified in the agreement, the agreement to expressly bind them, and it must be concluded by union/unions that have, as members, a majority of employees at the workplace. GPBC1754/2011 and GPBC1754/2011 (16 Feb 2012 .
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Bader Bop para 40.
The finding of the Labour Court
On review, the Labour Court was required to consider if the agreement conferring organisational rights on SACOSWU conflicted with the collective agreements concluded between POPCRU and the Department, and if it was therefore invalid and unenforceable.
In keeping with the ethos of voluntarism and in the absence of a duty to bargain, The requirement of identification is satisfied by reference to general categories of workers -as opposed to specified employees. In casu, the collective agreements concluded with POPCRU expressly bound all employees in the Departmental Bargaining Unit and extended the application of such agreement to all employees at the workplace. representative, and thus not legally entitled to such rights. Nonetheless, section 65(3)(a) of the LRA clearly states that the right to strike is prohibited where the issue in dispute is regulated by a collective agreement -in keeping with the legislative purpose of prohibiting strikes over rights' disputes and minimising the incidence of strikes.
The facts revealed that in POPCRU -unlike in Bader Bop 28 -the minority union was bound by the collective agreements concluded with the majority union, which fully "regulated" between collective bargaining and the right to strike", 30 there was "no point to collective bargaining on the issue" 31 and the parties were thus "not entitled to collectively bargain on the same". 32 More logical was the court's finding that collective bargaining between SACOSWU and the employer on organisational rightswhen such issues were comprehensively regulated by a pre-existing and binding collective agreement with POPCRU -was not a "legitimate labour issue" 33 and a strike in furtherance of such a right constitutes an "unlawful demand". 34 On this basis, the court in POPCRU was satisfied that the arbitrator's reliance on the dictum of the court in Bader Bop was misplaced, and was not binding in the circumstances.
In reaching its decision, the court held that a collective agreement concluded with a majority trade union:
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In Bader Bop the minority union was not bound by the collective agreement concluded with the majority union.
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The court in POPCRU, relying on the dictum of the court in Air Chefs (Pty) Organisational rights, made contingent upon admission to the DBC, were regulated by a collective agreement. 36 More importantly, the court was satisfied that the application of these agreements had been lawfully extended to SACOSWU members. 37 As SACOSWU had a membership of 2 000 employees and could not comply with the threshold -nor could it gain access to the DBC and concomitant organisational rights -the agreement concluded with SACOSWU was in conflict with the pre-existing dispensation.
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POPCRU 1149. The court was satisfied that a "collective agreement hierarchy" 38 should apply in a situation where a collective agreement concluded with a majority union is incompatible or conflicts with an agreement concluded with a minority union. In such a situation, the court held, the agreement concluded with the majority must take preference -in keeping with the interests of orderly collective bargaining and the principle of majoritarianism. The review was accordingly granted, and the collective agreement concluded with SACOSWU was declared invalid and set aside. The constitutional right of employees to strike in this matter must not be seen in isolation from the right of the members of NUM, Solidarity and UASA to collectively bargain with their employers. Accepting that NUM, Solidarity and UASA represented the majority of the employees in the workplace, it would be constitutional to allow the democratic process of the majoritarian representation to prevail. If the minority employees represented at the workplace by AMCU were to succeed and have a new wage agreement to come about and to supplant the existing collective agreement, the minorities would be governing for the majority in the workplace. That result is certainly undesirable.
On the return date of the rule nisi, legislative scheme applicable to collective bargaining. He noted that the majoritarian principle:
promotes orderly collective bargaining, a legitimate purpose of the LRA and serves the legislative purpose of advancing labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace and the creation of a framework within which parties can bargain collectively to determine wages and other terms and conditions of employment. If an employer and unions party to a collective agreement were denied the right to extend their agreement to non-party employees, collective bargaining would be characterised by opportunism and the attendant threat to the formation of stable relationships.
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The conflict between sections 18 and 20 was again addressed by the Labour Court in Transnet Soc Ltd v National Transport Movement (hereafter Transnet).
Judge Van
Niekerk considered whether or not a strike by a minority union to secure organisational rights was unprotected -in that it sought to compel the employer to perform the "unlawful act" of breaching a pre-existing and binding collective agreement with majority unions. In this matter the applicant, Transnet, had concluded a recognition agreement with a number of trade unions at the workplace, in terms of which thresholds of recognition were fixed for the attainment of organisational rights. Organisational rights were reserved for those unions that were deemed to be sufficiently representative -in that they represented a minimum of 30% of the employees at the workplace. The respondent, Transnet Soc Ltd -a minority union -sought to obtain organisational rights by means of strike action, despite falling well below the required threshold. The applicants argued that the collective agreement regulated the basis upon which organisational rights could be attained, and as the respondent did not meet the threshold requirements for organisational rights a demand for such entitlement would constitute a breach of the agreement. Judge Van Niekerk, 48 in determining the matter and without making reference to the finding of the court in POPCRU, noted that:
[w]hether a collective agreement concluded between an employer and third party unions may limit the right to strike by a non-party union, in my view, is a question that must be answered by the terms of the agreement, read with section 64 and section 65 of the Act.
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Chamber of Mines para 69.
Transnet Soc Ltd v National Transport Movement 2014 1 BLLR 98 (LC) (hereafter Transnet).
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Transnet 103.
Judge Van Niekerk was satisfied, on the facts, that the collective agreement regulated the organisational rights of the parties to the agreement, and did not appear to have been extended to bind those employees that were not members of any of the union-parties to the collective agreement. 49 As the minority union was not a party to the collective agreement (unlike in the POPCRU matter), the court was satisfied that it was not bound by the terms of the agreement, and that it was entitled to strike. In this regard, the finding of the court was consistent with the ratio of the court in POPCRU.
In considering if section 18 of the LRA could be relied upon to limit the right of minority unions to strike, Judge Van Niekerk -in Transnet -was of the view that the provision contemplates an agreement between a single majority trade union and the employer -unlike sections 14(1) and 16 (1), that permit "one or more" unions to act jointly to constitute a majority. As the collective agreement had been concluded between the employer and four trade unions, the court believed that it was not an agreement contemplated by section 18, and did not serve to bind the minority union. However, Judge Van Niekerk proceeded to find, albeit obiter, that even if section 18 permitted agreements between an employer and two or more minority unions acting jointly, there is no express limitation in sections 64 and 65 which prevents:
a minority union demanding those rights from seeking to bargain collectively to acquire them, or from exercising its right to strike should the employer resist the demand.
50
Judge Van Niekerk concluded that a correct interpretation -in keeping with international labour standards and constitutional protections -was that neither section 18 nor the terms of the collective agreement precluded the minority union from bargaining collectively or striking to secure organisational rights in the circumstances. In this regard, the court's view differed fundamentally from that in POPCRU.
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Analysis
The This winner-takes-all approach was developed and adopted when there was a fair degree of union stability, a growing consolidation within the trade union movement, and a strong commitment to social dialogue and inclusive solutions within the government, labour, business and civil society. But much has changed since then.
Abject poverty, a loss of confidence in existing bargaining structures, and disappointed expectations have led to the alienation of unskilled and semi-skilled vulnerable employees from majority unions. Minority unions have taken up the cudgels of frustrated and disempowered employees -that have tired of the "codependent comfort zone" 58 that majoritarianism has engendered. The Marikana experience has largely been attributed to the unsuitability of the current collective bargaining model within the South African socio-economic and political landscape. As Brassey 59 notes:
Majoritarianism, the leitmotief of both industry bargaining and plant-level organizational rights, is too crude to give proper expression to the interests of minority unions, which frequently represent skilled or semi-skilled workers but, as the Marikana experience demonstrates, who may simply be acting on behalf of workers who feel alienated from the majority union. agreements, by providing minority unions that represent a "significant interest" or "sufficient number of employees" at the workplace with a right to challenge unfair or unreasonable threshold agreements at arbitration.
62

Conclusion
The purpose of section 18 of the LRA is explained by the court in POPCRU as being:
to regulate the admission of trade unions to the bargaining relationship with the employer so as to avoid a situation of proliferation by a multitude of small trade unions in one employer and in particular where there is already an established relationship with a majority trade union.
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The finding of the court in POPCRU is in keeping with this intended purpose, and is appropriate within the context of a majoritarian regime. The purpose and intention of this provision is consistent with the legislative framework adopted by the drafters of the LRA, and is also in keeping with international conventions and the constitutional limitation clause. Nonetheless, the Marikana experience and the strike violence that has marred the South African labour market in recent times reveal the flaws in the majoritarian framework and the changed dynamic of the collective bargaining environment.
It may be time to return to the drawing board.
61
S 21(8D) of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill B16 of 2012. This provision is deemed to apply to any dispute referred to the CCMA after the commencement of the Act -irrespective of the date of conclusion of the s 18 agreement.
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As with all rights-based disputes, it is assumed that the right to strike will be excluded in such circumstances. That being the case, the dictum of the court in Bader Bop will not extend to organisational rights regulated by binding s 18 agreements. 
